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Arguing that studies of the Enlightenment have tended to ignore Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
and that accounts of Rousseau have typically overlooked his debts to the Enlightenment, Mark 
Hulliung convincingly portrays Rousseau as both a creature and a critic of the Enlightenment.  
Rousseau emerges from this immensely learned study as an “autocritic” of Enlightenment, expert 
in the conventions of eighteenth century thought, who turned the weapons forged by the 
Enlightenment onto the movement itself.  The great service of this book lies in its revealing the 
fundamental philosophical disagreements that lay at the heart of a quarrel that, by the end of 
Rousseau’s life, had degenerated on both sides into ad hominem attacks.  For Hulliung, the battle 
of Rousseau and the philosophes becomes nothing less than a debate on the nature, limits, and 
promise of the Enlightenment itself. 
Much of the book is devoted to a meticulous demonstration of the extent to which 
Rousseau’s critique spoke to longstanding concerns of Enlightenment thought.  When the 
philosophes attempted to reconcile interest with virtue, Rousseau confirmed their worst fears, 
arguing that in societies ruled by self-interest, civic virtue withered.  When they wrote histories 
that focused on culture, rather than politics, Rousseau countered by emphasizing the centrality of 
political history for any understanding of contemporary culture.  They called for a separation of 
church and state;  he argued that republican virtue required civic religion.  He used the 
Enlightenment’s own natural histories to argue that the philosophes’ views on social progress 
were hopelessly naive.  Even his withdrawal from Paris, ridiculed by those who saw the city as 
the epitome of civilized society, is viewed by Hulliung not as a repudiation of the ideal of 
Enlightenment but rather a gesture that questioned what it meant to be enlightened:  “By 
implication all who stayed in Paris were obstacles to enlightenment properly understood” (76).  
Hulliung is slightly less convincing when he insists that Rousseau’s aim was to rescue 
rather than repudiate the Enlightenment.  His case hinges on the argument that Diderot, Duclos, 
D’Alembert held misgivings about the project of Enlightenment that converged with Rousseau’s 
more emphatic critique.  To the extent that Hulliung can show that Rousseau was simply stating 
explicitly and publicly the conclusions that some of the leading philosophes had reached more 
hesitantly or — in the case of Rameau’s Nephew — in works that would appear only 
posthumously, then his portrait of Rousseau as an autocritic rather than a renegade rings true.    
While Hulliung makes a compelling case that some of the arguments Diderot offered in 
Rameau’s Nephew called into question his long-held conviction that “even in a society as poorly 
ordered as ours … there is no better path to happiness than to be a good man,” Hulliung tends to 
assume too quickly that the Nephew’s attacks on this belief carry the day (99).  Diderot did, after 
all, eventually provide the Nephew’s antagonist with some responses and while these may not 
always convince us, it is somewhat rash to assume that Diderot himself viewed them as 
completely empty.  Further, while Hulliung carefully shows us what Rousseau found lacking in 
the philosophes’ Enlightenment, it is not entirely clear whether the arguments he offered in Julie, 
Emile, and the Social Contract really constitute a “positive program for an alternative 
enlightenment” (225).  Readers may leave the book still questioning whether Rousseau shared 
anything with his former colleagues other than their most troubling doubts. 
The tension between the promise announced in the book’s title and the more precise focus 
delineated in the subtitle captures what is at stake rather nicely:  in what sense does the quarrel 
between “Rousseau and the Philosophes” constitute an “Autocritique of Enlightenment”?  
Hulliung rightly notes that “It was one of Rousseau’s gifts that he always succeeded in bringing 
out the worst in the philosophes” (208).  The book amply demonstrates that the same could be 
said of their ability to bring out the worst in him.  Attacking his person, they prompted Rousseau 
to produce the autobiographical testimonials to his own sincerity that, while inspiring the coming 
generation of Romantics, did little to explain what Enlightenment was.  To understand 
Rousseau’s role in the autocritique of Enlightenment it may be necessary to turn from the 
philosophes  and consider the impact of his work on Enlighteners more sympathetic to his 
arguments.  It was, after all, a reading of Rousseau that persuaded no less an Aufklärer  than Kant 
that an understanding of Enlightenment that ignored questions of morality misunderstood what 
Enlightenment truly involved. 
 
James Schmidt 
Boston University 
